On April 30, U.S. Navy Admiral Frank Bradley, head of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), defended requests for an increased budget to the Senate.
Bradley argued that SOCOM required additional aerial and waterborne drones as well as “more exquisite ranges” for training special operations forces (SOF) taking part in high-end conflicts in addition to counterterrorism operations.
The Pentagon’s budgetary request for fiscal year 2027 included an increase of about $1.5 billion in funds for SOCOM. Most of the addition is devoted to requests for operations and maintenance funding, increased from $9.7 billion in fiscal year 2026 to $10.9 billion for fiscal year 2027. Procurement requests also increased from $2.5 billion in 2026 to $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2027.
A longtime advocate for expanding SOCOM funding, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated during the outset of the hearing on SOCOM funding that “the funding provided to Special Operations Command has not kept pace with the seemingly insatiable demand for its capabilities.”
A Time for Bold Moves
The Special Operations Association of America’s (SOAA) Chairman of the Board, former Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller defended the increase in Breaking Defense. “Much like in the post-9/11 era, special operations are the go-to force for the most difficult and ‘no-fail’ strategic missions for the United States,” Miller wrote. “Yet we continue to under-resource this game-changing capability.”
Miller reports that SOCOM’s budget “has been flat” since fiscal year 2019, despite a 300% increase in “demand for special operations capabilities” over the last five years. According to Miller, Bradley told the House Armed Services Committee in March that SOCOM was forced to “deny requests for special operations capabilities on 70 different occasions” due to a lack of resources.
To rectify the resource iniquity, Miller argued for an earned “promotion” for special operations, starting with the elevation of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict “to a level which sufficiently reflects the more significant role special operations plays in our national defense.”
Miller also called for “bold action” to “stem the tide,” rather than the “incrementalism” that he said “is not sufficient in meeting the moment.” With SOCOM’s current budget request consisting of just over 1% of the defense budget, Miller also argues that SOCOM’s budget ought to reach “at least $24 billion by [fiscal year 2031,]” which would still make up under 2% of total projected defense spending.
What the Budget Funds
SOAA Deputy Chief of Staff Jack Barry says that SOCOM’s budget request reflects an “environment that is markedly different than it was ten years ago. We are training for near-peer and peer competition, in more demanding, fast paced threat conditions than ever before.” He argues that it is “more resource intensive” to remain ahead of this “fundamentally different problem set.”
“Higher-end environments demand higher-end equipment, which demands research and development. New equipment demands testing in the field against new countermeasures, using new tactics and eventually newly written doctrine. That entire cycle, from prototype to doctrine, is what the increased budget actually buys,” Barry says.
SOCOM’s budgetary requests also come with changes in planned procurement and signaling in the acquisitions space for needed future innovations.
Savvy onlookers have noted a distinct change in SOCOM’s aviation plans for fiscal year 2027.
SOCOM previously focused aerial acquisitions on the OA-1K Skyraider II aircraft, a platform that can manage light attack, close air support, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. After purchasing 12 OA-1Ks in 2025 and six in 2026, SOCOM plans to buy just two Skyraider IIs for 2027.
However, in fiscal year 2027, SOCOM will nearly triple its 2026 spending on the MQ-9 Reaper, requesting $75.8 million for the platform. About $48 million from this expenditure will be spent on the Adaptive Airborne Enterprise (A2E), which turns the Reaper into a “mobile control center for a network of small drones which can form an ‘expansive sensing grid’ to find targets or create communications pathways for special operators deep in the battlespace.”
SOCOM has released a request for partners to help create new technologies on the U.S. government’s System for Award Management site. The request is posted under a Department of Defense procurement authority that will allow for quicker development of prototypes than the typical procurement process allows.
SOCOM’s requests fall under six areas. They include uncrewed systems capable of intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance, counter-drone systems “optimized to reduce weight and power requirements,” “‘scalable’ kinetic and non-kinetic systems” for supporting SOF missions, and mechanisms for reducing “psychological burnout” for SOF personnel.
How SOF Have Excelled
By design, the achievements of our SOF personnel typically occur without much fanfare, which Barry says allow people to “take for granted how good our most elite forces really are.” The last six months, however, have been a departure from the norm as significant SOF deployments widened the aperture on their operations.
Beginning in September 2025, the world learned that operators were targeting boats carrying illicit drugs from South America towards the United States during the buildup of forces around Venezuela. When SOF elements were at the forefront of the high-profile capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro in Operation Absolute Resolve in December, Americans not only learned about which elements took part in the raid, but about how they trained for the task and what types of weapons systems were involved in the takedown.
In April, after an F-15E Strike Eagle was downed in Iranian airspace, the media reported in incredible detail that SOF elements were instrumental in the operation to retrieve the jet’s pilot and Weapon Systems Officer behind enemy lines.
Even SOF training exercises that might otherwise go under the radar became important news stories. The death of the head of the fentanyl trafficking organization Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, better known as ‘El Mencho,’ led to violence throughout Mexico in February. As the possibility of cartel turf wars hinted at further instability, Navy SEAL Team Two and Green Berets from the 7th Special Forces Group engaged in separate training exercises with their Mexican counterparts in early 2026.
In April, a highly-visible SOF exercise in Libya, Flintlock 2026, also reminded the world of how well-postured SOF are to promote the resolution of internal crises in a manner that could have implications across a continent that is rife with disorder.
Between SOF’s visible successes and their quieter wins, Barry says that “there isn’t a more dominant force anywhere on earth.” Barry attributes this mastery to “layered repetition over decades.”
“Our operators do the impossible because the nation gave them the time, the ranges, and the equipment to do so. As the environment evolves, the reps have to evolve with it,” Barry said. To prepare for future conflict zones, Barry argues that practicing in “contested electromagnetic environments and integrating manned-unmanned teaming at the squad level is what SOCOM’s budget is really funding.”
