There’s a dangerous myth circulating in national security circles: That retooling American defense to confront the growing threat from China requires a shift back to the old ways of fighting wars.
In the years after 9/11, Special Operations Forces (SOF) were used like never before. As the U.S. ramped up the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the nature of fighting irregular forces like al-Qaida and Iraqi militias – rather than formal state militaries – shifted the Pentagon’s focus away from conventional forces.
Now as America pivots again, this time toward Great Power Competition with China, the same shift has been happening in reverse. Defense planners, operating with limited budgets and seeing China’s build-up of conventional military forces, are redirecting resources away from SOF and back toward conventional forces.
This is a mistake. The idea that fighting China equals “conventional” warfare is based on wishful thinking, not strategic analysis or history.
A Defeatist Approach to Today’s Threats
Just like after Vietnam, America’s defense establishment has decided that irregular warfare is “not our thing.” An all-too-common trope is that the U.S. must return to fighting the kinds of wars it knows how to win.
We may prefer conflicts that, like World War II, involve clear front lines, well defined enemies and allies, and decisive tank battles. Yet a WWII-style approach fundamentally misunderstands how China plans to beat us, and would leave us highly vulnerable to novel avenues of attack.
Since WWII, at least half of conflicts have involved a great power adversary using irregular warfare, according to a study by Dr. Sam Plapinger and Kevin Pollpeter at the Center for Naval Analyses. In an article describing their findings, the authors wrote:
“The first reason US forces should expect to encounter irregular warfare in a conflict with China is that such activities have been an integral part of conflicts involving great powers for three-quarters of a century.”
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not plan to meet our carriers with theirs. Beijing is fighting a different war entirely–one that will force us to adapt.
Understanding Irregular Warfare
What do we mean when we talk about irregular warfare?
In an unclassified annex to the National Defense Strategy in 2020, the Department of Defense defined irregular warfare as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy,” favoring “indirect and asymmetric approaches.” The key here is that irregular warfare shifts the focus to populations, rather than simply to destroying enemy units.
Our false notion that these are two different strategies is a liability. In preparing for potential conflict with America, our adversaries no longer see a distinction between conventional and irregular warfare.
In its defense writings, described in the Pentagon’s annual China Military Power Report to Congress, the PLA refers to “informationized” wars, with regular and irregular forces synchronized to achieve battlefield victory.
Examining China’s Irregular Arsenal
Plapinger and Pollpeter have identified three key pillars of China’s irregular warfare arsenal that work in tandem:
- “The Three Warfares” allow Beijing to prepare the battlefield before any shots are fired. Through psychological operations, aggressive shaping of public opinion, and lawfare, China aims to create maximum narrative space for military action by first winning the information battle.
- Paramilitary forces not formally under PLA control provide plausible deniability. The most prominent example to date has been China’s fleets of fishing boats, deployed essentially as maritime militia, to enforce its territorial claims without triggering an escalatory military response. The People’s Armed Police (PAP), which is primarily focused on domestic security but has been deployed abroad to partner nations, is another example of China’s holistic defense thinking.
- Special Operations Forces (SOF) deliver surgical strikes once the Three Warfares have laid the groundwork and paramilitary forces have helped establish de facto control in an area. Unlike American SOF, which excelled at training local forces during the GWOT, Chinese special operators have traditionally been focused squarely on direct action missions.
Getting Back on Track
It’s precisely because China refuses to fight conventionally that America must urgently invest in its SOF capabilities.
America’s special operators possess the skills, training and mindset to operate in the gray zone where China excels. Already, special operators work with allies across the Indo-Pacific, using specialized language abilities and training skills to strengthen regional networks that can counter Chinese influence operations.
U.S. defense planners have successfully retooled our conventional warfare strategy to address China’s modern capabilities, such as the PLA’s investment in rocket forces. Shifting resources now from SOF toward conventional forces would ignore China’s broader strategy, ultimately making conflict and a Chinese victory more likely.
