In today’s fast-changing operational environment, our Great Power rivals understand us better than we understand them. America still has the most powerful military in the world, but adversaries have realized that they can operate in the “gray zone” between war and peace without incurring America’s wrath.
Anybody who had experience in operational planning during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) saw this firsthand: endless PowerPoint decks, indecipherable flowcharts, and diagrams that tried unsuccessfully to paint a comprehensive picture of complex concepts, from counterinsurgency dynamics to Department of Defense (DoD) procurement processes.
Ultimately, these attempts to create an easy, one-size-fits-all guide to responding to hypothetical events did more to confuse and waste time than they ever did to help neutralize terrorist threats. Unfortunately, we are now repeating this mistake as we shift our focus toward Great Power Competition with Russia, China, and Iran.
Why it Matters: Assessing the Future Battlefield
Like it or not, our adversaries understand the vulnerability inherent in this approach. They may not be comfortable facing us in a conventional war now, but political warfare is enabling them to tilt the potential future battlefield in their favor. At some point, the advantage they’re accumulating could render us unable to act, whether due to lack of political legitimacy, a weakened international position, or both.
Our rivals’ political warfare tactics operate in a gray zone precisely because they know it’s where U.S. defense planners struggle to act. You have likely heard of terms like Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, and so on. These terms have been tossed around casually, with every foreign policy analyst assigning their own definitions. This has not only led to confusion, but even worse, inaction.
When it comes to countering rivals like Russia and China, focusing too much on precisely defining “irregular,” “unconventional,” or “political” warfare can be counterproductive. Instead of seeking absolute definitions for these methods of fighting, which can be difficult given their fluid nature, analysts and defense planners should simply describe the tactics involved. A descriptive approach provides the conceptual flexibility needed to quickly align our actions with the real-world environment.
Dealing with “Risk Confusion”
Nathan Frier of the U.S. Army War College provides an example of how describing, rather than defining, can facilitate action by accurately identifying the real problem.
Chinese defense planners have referred to their strategy as “unrestricted warfare.” The term highlights how their strategy involves few, if any, limits.
Without limits, the potential for escalation across various domains is significant. The resulting response from the U.S. has led to what Frier describes as “risk confusion”.
“Our Russian and Chinese gray-zone adversaries successfully manipulate risk calculus, transferring the preponderance of risk onto U.S. and allied decision-makers. Each successful Russian or Chinese gray-zone maneuver creates new opportunities for their exploitation.”
The confusion stems from the fact that gray-zone tactics inherently use a combination of methods across different domains, making the proper response difficult to determine. The potential costs of misjudging a gray-zone provocation and escalating often seem to outweigh the more distant consequences of inaction.
However, inaction itself carries huge risks, by allowing rivals to achieve strategic objectives and solidify their gains, as Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and the South China Sea have shown. This inaction also weakens American credibility and emboldens adversaries to engage in further gray-zone activities.
Choosing Action Over Paralysis
Rival Great Powers have accurately assessed that U.S. defense planners prefer inaction that avoids long-term, irreversible damage over quick action that could incur immediate but reversible damage. This assessment drives our rivals’ strategic calculus. They understand that American decision-makers will choose paralysis over potential escalation, even when that paralysis increases the chances of strategic defeat.
Our rivals are not paralyzed by PowerPoint. They have identified what works and are pressing an advantage. If and when we effectively counter this advantage, we should expect them to adapt accordingly.
If we want to throw our adversaries’ gray-zone operations off balance, we must create a similar risk confusion for their defense planners. Breaking this pattern requires institutional courage and operational thinking at the strategic level. America needs decision-makers confident enough to act on 70% information, rather than analysts who wait for 100% certainty.
