A Review of Foreign Operations in the U.S. Information Environment

Joe Mulholland, SOAA member and former skillbridge fellow, former Green Beret, and current student at Georgetown graduate school, on how foreign disinformation and deception effects perceptions:

What are Operations in the Information Environment?

Operations in the information environment include a wide range of activities, from influencing foreign populations, to penetrating foreign information apparatuses⁵⁴. The desired end state of these activities is to influence the behavior of a designated population. There are three common forms of information that actors leverage in these operations: propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation⁵⁰. Propaganda is the spread of information, true or false, to manipulate a population’s beliefs. Propaganda can include true information that is taken out of context. Disinformation is the spread of false information that the spreader knows to be false – a deliberate effort to deceive. Misinformation is the propagation of false information that the propagator believes to be true – an action that can unintentionally deceive.

Foreign operations in the U.S. information environment are not a new phenomenon in the American media landscape. According to an article published by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, World War 1 marked the first instance of widespread propaganda during the 20^th Century⁴⁷. Its use continued during World War 2, with the Nazis implementing it liberally⁴⁷^,⁴⁸. Nazi Germany, in the 1930s, took several measures to propagate pro-Nazi messaging throughout America’s media ecosystem⁴⁸. Some American public relations firms even accepted bids to work for the Nazi regime. Roy P. Monahan, a World War 1 veteran and anti-Nazi advocate in New York, testified on alleged Nazi propaganda before Congress in 1938⁴⁹. He correctly asserted that Camp Siegfried, a recreation center on Long Island established by the German American Bund, was spreading Nazi ideology to American kids^49,⁵².

Going back to the Cold War, Russia has sought to sow discord between the American people¹. Philip Ewing, of National Public Radio, highlighted several of these efforts. In one instance, the Soviets launched a propaganda campaign targeted at nonwhite Americans. The goal of the campaign was to convince them, “that HIV and AIDS were developed by the CIA as a bio-weapon” to disrupt their social progress¹. This story took advantage of racial tensions that existed in America at the time. Jewish and Black activists in New York were the target of another Russian plot, as Russia strove to stir controversy between the two groups. In the 1980s, the Soviet government attempted to delegitimize President Reagan by disseminating a fabricated memo indicating he had worked with Congress to expose Communist sympathizers in 1940s Hollywood⁹.

Foreign powers continue to plague the American media ecosystem through operations in the information environment, perhaps more today than ever before, due to the rapidly changing information ecosystem²⁷^,⁴⁰. The focus of this paper is operations in the information environment since the lead-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election from three state actors: Russia, China, and Iran. The three actors chosen rank as the intelligence community’s top three state actor threats to American security (note: the intelligence community ranks China as America’s primary state actor threat; Russia is listed first in this paper, because its operations in the information environment seem to be the most effective of the three nations)²⁷.

The 2016 U.S. presidential election is the temporal backstop of this paper because, in the author’s opinion, that election was the starting point of the current era of American politics, marked by especially harsh rhetoric and division between Democrats and Republicans. These actors’ operations in the information environment betray three over-arching goals: sow societal discord in the U.S., interfere in U.S. elections, and disrupt U.S. foreign policy. This paper will discuss examples of operations in the information environment from each of these state actors over the past eight years to illuminate how those efforts supported the three aforementioned goals.

Russian Operations in the U.S. Information Environment

For years, Russia has worked hard to try to stir societal discord in the U.S¹^,⁷^,⁹^,³⁰. In the lead-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian agents began posting politically charged comments about police abuses towards Black Americans⁷^,³⁰. According to a 2019 report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Black Americans were targeted more than any other group on social media by Russian disinformation. Since 2016, Russian agents have sought to hijack sentiments and discourse coming out of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement⁷^,³⁰^,³¹^,³². Unfortunately, Russian-sponsored social media pages have gained widespread exposure among Americans. At one time, the Russian-controlled Facebook page, “Blacktivist” was engaged by online users more than 11 million times⁷. Social engagement (presumably the same thing as “user engagement”), according to Meta, includes, “likes, shares, comments, video views or follows.”⁴¹ At the same time, under different accounts, Russian agents posted comments claiming that BLM-affiliated individuals posed a threat to police officers³⁰. Russia’s aim here was clear – sow discord and distrust between Americans to damage America’s stability. Russian agents took advantage of real events (wrongful police shootings and killings of Black Americans), by spreading sensationalized claims and disinformation related to the events to incite further turmoil.

Russia has proven it can orchestrate physical political activity in the United States through abuses of information. As of 2018, Russian agents had successfully organized protests in at least three different American cities³¹. On July 10, 2016, Russian agents facilitated two different rallies, one in support of Philando Castile, a Black American killed by police, and the other, a “Blue Lives Matter” rally, held in support of the police³². They intended to get media coverage on both events, likely to highlight division in the U.S. In another instance of covert Russian organizations catalyzing American action, a Russian-controlled social media account organized a pro-Muslim and an anti-Muslim protest on the same day, time, and location in Texas⁷^, ¹⁷^,²⁰^,²⁵. Thankfully, it appeared that these protests did not devolve into violence. However, given that verbal altercations between both groups did occur, it is not a stretch of the imagination to see how they could have. Russian-controlled social media organizations took advantage of real events or existing sentiments to influence Americans’ behavior.

American intelligence agencies have found evidence of Russian meddling in U.S. federal elections over the past eight years²^,³^,⁴^,⁵^,⁶^,⁸. The Director of National Intelligence concluded that in 2020, the Russian government conducted influence operations aimed at, “undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the U.S.”³ The DNI found evidence that Russia sought to undermine President Biden’s candidacy and to support President-Elect Trump. Russian election interference continued through 2024, largely with continued efforts to support the election of President-Elect Trump⁵. In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Russian trolls, “posted allegations on social media about the possibility of illegal voting, including by undocumented immigrants and deceased individuals”³⁷.

Russia has also directly targeted American foreign policy through disinformation campaigns⁴⁴. In 2022, Russian officials, to include their ambassador to the UN, began spreading disinformation about U.S.-sponsored biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine⁴⁴. This was an attempt to diminish international support for Ukraine and the U.S. This disinformation was re-broadcast by multiple different media sources in the U.S., including Fox News. In actuality, the U.S. does sponsor laboratories in Ukraine, as it does in many post-Soviet Union countries. The labs are designed to improve public health research in these nations. Unfortunately, Russian disinformation campaigns have grown in their efficacy. Members of Congress have even fallen under the influence of Russian propaganda⁴²^,⁴³. This has included belief in the notion that American aid to Ukraine went to yachts for Volodymyr Zelenskyy⁴³.

Pro-Russian social media accounts also posted disinformation and propaganda regarding the train derailment in Ohio in 2023³⁶. They asserted that the U.S. government was covering up the true nature and effects of the disaster. Their posts also sought to incite anger towards U.S. aid to Ukraine. One stated, “Biden offers food, water, medicine, shelter, payouts of pension and social services to Ukraine! Ohio first! Offer and deliver to Ohio!”³⁶ A United Kingdom-based nonprofit organization called Reset identified the accounts. Of note, Reset was not able to confirm that all the accounts were tied to the Russian government. However, all the accounts reiterated pro-Russian messages. For example, an American-based account called Truth Poke readily re-posted Russia Today (RT) news clippings. When Reset questioned Truth Poke about their rampant propagation of RT news, they denied being an agent of Russian propaganda. David Klepper, who covered this story for the Associated Press, noted how instances like this showed just how pervasive pro-Russian narratives were. Even American media organizations would re-post them, ostensibly free of charge for Russia.

In 2024, Russia placed increased focus on U.S. domestic issues³⁵. These largely consisted of content designed to inflame tensions over America’s southern border. Such content included posts about Laken Riley’s killing by an undocumented immigrant, Trump’s border wall, and anti-immigration protests in Texas. Bret Schafer, who monitors disinformation for the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, felt that, through these efforts, Russia aimed to make voters feel like America’s support to Ukraine was detracting from its ability to secure its border with Mexico.

In September 2024, the U.S. Justice Department seized, “32 internet domains used in Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns colloquially referred to as ‘Doppelganger,’ in violation of U.S. money laundering and criminal trademark laws”¹⁸. The Justice Department released numerous confiscated communiques from Russian government officials to pro-Russian media outlets, explaining which narratives to employ. For example, one set of confiscated instructions stated that outlets should appeal to America’s conservative voters who supported, “traditional family values,” and to “White Americans, representing the lower-middle and middle class”³⁴. This same set of instructions dictated several topics that the content should focus on, including the “Risk of job loss for white Americans,” and the “Threat of crime coming from people of color and immigrants (including new immigrants from Ukraine)”³⁴.

Chinese Operations in the U.S. Information Environment

China is operating in America’s information sphere as well²³. According to the U.S. State Department, “The PRC [People’s Republic of China] spends billions of dollars annually on foreign information manipulation efforts”²³. Regarding foreign policy and election interference, in 2024, China focused on “down-ballot Republican candidates as well as sitting members of Congress who promote policies adversarial to China or in conflict with its interests”³⁸.

A major Chinese information network is called “Spamouflage”²¹^,²²^,²⁶. According to a Meta report on foreign influence operations published in August 2023, Spamouflage was the “largest cross-platform influence operation disrupted to date”²⁶. Spamouflage actively works to advance the interests of the PRC¹⁹. Additionally, Meta asserted that Chinese law enforcement is connected to Spamouflage⁴⁶. A likely component of Spamouflage is the “War of Somethings” (“WOS”) network²¹. While WOS is not fully proven to be based in China, it most likely is. The vast majority of its activity takes place during China’s workday hours and it behaves similarly to previously identified Spamouflage activity. Many of its posts seek to criticize American politics and policy. Some posts seem to target a left-leaning audience, by criticizing America’s support to Israel. Others try to appeal to America’s right, by stating that, “Biden has lost the hearts and minds of the people”²¹.

Accounts linked to Spamouflage have posted various different types of messages⁴⁵. For example, in 2023, the network propagated conspiracy theories that the U.S. government was testing a “weather weapon” that had caused the Maui wildfires⁴⁶^,⁵¹. Also, Spamouflage accounts often impersonated American accounts⁴⁵. A company named Graphika identified 17 different Spamouflage accounts that pretended to be American, in an apparent effort to gain influence in the U.S. (of note, these 17 accounts were only a small aspect of Spamouflage’s operations in the information environment). The vast majority of the accounts were on X. One pretended to be a U.S. media outlet and had a presence on multiple platforms. Lastly, one operated on Tik Tok. Out of all the content generated by these accounts, only one Tik Tok video garnered a significant number of views. This vignette, of one influential video being identified out of 17 accounts examined, seems to be representative of Spamouflage’s lack of efficacy. Overall, the network seems to have far less influence than comparative Russian efforts. As Jack Stubbs, the chief intelligence officer for Graphika put it, Spamouflage has “high volume, low impact”⁴⁵. Still, Spamouflage is significant, as it shows that China is willing and able to penetrate America’s media ecosystem.

Iranian Operations in the U.S. Information Environment

In addition to Russia and China, Iran has also infiltrated America’s media environment³⁹. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in 2011, stated that Iran’s information “jihad” extended into the digital domain, and formed the Supreme Council for Cyberspace³⁹. Khamenei has asked his government and military to work alongside this council. Iran increased its election interference efforts dramatically after several of President Trump’s actions during his first term. These included the killing of Major General Qassim Suleimani, the application of sanctions on Iran, and the American departure from the nuclear treaty.

Regarding election interference, the DNI found that Iran sought to, “…undermine public confidence in the electoral process and U.S. institutions, and sow division and exacerbate societal tensions in the U.S.”³. In one instance, Iranian actors disseminated a video that painted mail-in voting in a negative light, implying that it could not be trusted³⁹. Unlike Russia, Iran intended to undermine former President Trump’s ability to gain reelection. While Iran opposed and Russia supported the same candidate, they both sought to hijack political tensions in America and undermine Americans’ confidence in the electoral system³.

Iran’s operations in the information environment efforts have continued to grow³⁹. In 2021, Microsoft identified seven different influence campaigns from Iran; in 2022 they identified 24. While most of their efforts seemed to target Donald Trump, some even went after President Biden and Vice President Harris. For example, Iranian-backed accounts have alleged that Vice President Harris has Communist tendencies. This seems to indicate that their broader objective is to pit Americans against each other, and to diminish America’s image of being a vibrant democracy.

According to an Iranian state media employee and an Iranian official, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls various companies that spread pro-Iranian messages³⁹. Additionally, they claimed that the IRGC recruits tech-savvy Iranian individuals and organizations to run influence accounts, sometimes without those individuals or organizations knowing the full scope of the IRGC’s intentions. Both Iranian officials claimed that Iran’s deeper goal, beyond election interference, was to increase the political tension in America and worsen the rift between the two major political parties. They also claimed that influence efforts sought to increase Iran’s status as a Great Power. When speaking on Iranian disinformation efforts, Bret Schafer stated, “They clearly are not concerned about blowback. The risk tolerance is quite high and that makes them a concern…”³⁹. Among other things, Iran seeks to decrease America’s backing for Israel. It actively supported anti-Israel protests following the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza³³. Iranian online influencers have pretended to be anti-Israeli activists on social media and have tried to inspire protests in that role, according to Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. Iranian influencers have even provided protesters with money. Haines stated, “Americans who are being targeted by this Iranian campaign may not be aware that they are interacting with or receiving support from a foreign government”³³.

The Compounding Effect of Artificial Intelligence

Russia, China, and Iran have all made use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to wage operations in the information environment against the U.S²⁸^, ³⁹^,⁴⁶. Iranian actors, using AI, posted news articles that pretended to belong to authentic news outlets³⁹. A social media account linked to Chinese activity leveraged AI to spread disinformation about the Maui wildfires⁴⁶. The Justice Department disrupted a Russian bot-farm that implemented AI to spread disinformation²⁸. According to the department, “The social media bot farm used elements of AI to create fictitious social media profiles — often purporting to belong to individuals in the United States — which the operators then used to promote messages in support of Russian government objectives”²⁸. In an article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Emily Harding noted how much AI can magnify operations in the information environment⁴⁰. For example, she stated that AI allowed actors like Russia to more rapidly identify themes and messages that resonated with large populations, and then to disseminate them at scale. Elise Thomas, a senior analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), is concerned that if China can make better use of AI, its network Spamouflage could gain significant traction⁴⁶.

Are Operations in the U.S. Information Environment Effective?

Of note, researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace highlighted the difficulty in determining the efficacy of foreign information operations²⁴. Amidst this uncertainty, a few things still stand out. Russia has orchestrated protests in the U.S. through operations in the information environment²⁵^,³¹^,³². Members of Congress have mistakenly recited Russian propaganda in the Capitol⁴²^,⁴³. A Pew Research Center survey showed that in 2018, 87% of Republicans believed elections would either be run “very well” or “somewhat well”¹⁰. In 2022, only 56% of Republicans held the same sentiments (of note, the percentage of Democrats who believed U.S. elections would be run “somewhat well” or “very well” actually increased during the same timeframe)¹⁰. The Associated Press-National Opinion Research Center for Public Affairs Research conducted similar polling⁵³. It revealed that in 2018, 54% of Republicans had high confidence in vote counts. By 2024, that percentage dropped to only 22% (like the Pew study, they found that, “Democrats’ confidence in elections has risen in recent years”)⁵³. Russia been denigrating U.S. elections over the past eight years²^,³^,⁴^,⁵^,⁶^,⁸. China and Iran have increased their election interference efforts in recent years³^,³⁷^,³⁸. Thus, there is reason to believe that their efforts have contributed to some Americans’ lack of trust of the electoral process. Other factors likely contributed more to these sentiments, such as rhetoric from President-Elect Trump¹¹. Nonetheless, the possibility that foreign operations in the information environment had some effect on Americans’ opinions remains. Furthermore, this lack of trust likely did not come from objective evidence. While the state of Ohio did find that 27 ballots (out of 5,883,999 ballots cast) may have been illegal in 2020, this was hardly a sign of organized fraud¹²^,¹⁵. In fact, after exhaustive review, officials found a profound lack of evidence for widespread fraud in the 2020 federal election in other swing states like Georgia, Nevada, and Arizona¹³^,¹⁴^,¹⁶.

Conclusion

Foreign disinformation efforts will likely continue to grow⁴⁰. Findings by the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Russia, China, and Iran will continue to be major players in this space²⁷. Through their operations in the information environment, these three actors have sought to interfere in U.S. elections, disrupt U.S. foreign policy, and sow societal discord in the U.S. Unfortunately, the development of Artificial Intelligence will make these efforts more pervasive and likely more effective⁴⁰.

Former-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta feels that this is an incredibly urgent problem the U.S. must find a way to solve²⁹. In his view, foreign actors’ ability to sway public opinion poses a national security threat. The most alarming indicators have been Russian-orchestrated protests and Russian propaganda influencing members of Congress¹⁷^,³¹^,³²^,⁴²^,⁴³. Americans must remain vigilant and continually question the authenticity and intentions of digital media sources, lest they become pawns in another country’s chess game.

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